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WILL THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 STILL HOLD UP IN 2004?
How ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY HAS CREATED A NEED FOR
CHANGE IN THE "SYSTEM OF RECORDS" ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The notion of privacy is one central to the values and principles of the
United States.' Ever since the publication of the famous law review article
by Brandeis and Warren in 1890,2 the courts have been cluttered with cases
attempting to define the reaches and the limits of privacy guarantees.' In
their article, Brandeis and Warren laid out the principle of privacy law, par-
ticularly with respect to privacy torts, and since then, the notion has been all
but unstoppable.4 The article was a reaction to the times: to the advent of
tabloid journalism,5 to attacks of the press, and some say, to the prying eyes
of journalists into the private lives of the authors.6 Regardless of the authors'
motivations, their article was the tremor that started the avalanche of privacy
claims, defenses, and disagreements.
At the same time privacy notions developed in the public's mind, a cer-
tain lack of familiarity to the everyday interactions between people and or-
1. Although not expressly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has
held that privacy is implied in the Bill of Rights, because the "penumbras" of the various
amendments create "zones of privacy." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Along with the ideals of individual freedoms and the interests of the founders of this country
in independence, the notion of privacy is essentially the desire of citizens to be left alone. At
common law, privacy has been broken down into four main categories: public disclosure, in-
trusion, appropriation, and false light. The Privacy Act of 1974 deals primarily with the first
and second categories. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
3. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2nd Cir. 1973);
Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
4. Consider the escalation in privacy tort suits throughout the twentieth century and the
courts' increasing acceptance of them, along with the wider recognition that there are bounda-
ries the press should not be allowed to cross. Of course, this might not have become an issue
if the press had not tried to cross more boundaries. In the past, the press respected the private
lives of public officials, such as President Roosevelt's confinement to a wheelchair, and did
not attempt to publish intrusive articles. Today, even the lives of private citizens are at risk of
exposure if they happen to find themselves involved in some public event or scandal.
5. Amazingly, tabloid journalism had already gotten its start by the end of the nineteenth
century. While the articles were hardly on par with the bizarre stories seen in our supermarket
check out lines today, they did provide entertainment with society articles and similar pieces.
6. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
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ganizations also arose. No longer can one count on being remembered by lo-
cal shopkeepers as a recent or even a long-time customer.7 As society and
the federal government have grown in size and complexity, the number of
records maintained on individuals has also grown.8 Like many things in to-
day's world, the quantity and detail of information the government maintains
on its citizens would astound someone from the last century, as it would
most likely amaze citizens of today, too.
The idea of statutory protection for citizens against the records main-
tained by the government grew out of this increase in recordkeeping.9 Yet
even as Congress has attempted to provide protection and assurances for
citizens, technology has advanced to outstrip its efforts. Consider the re-
markable advances in data storage just in the past ten years. What used to fill
tape drives now fits on the laptops seen in every classroom and coffee shop
across the country.' So how are members of the public to know what files
the government has on them? How are individuals to ensure that their re-
cords are correct? How are agencies to know what files they may or may not
disclose and who they must allow to access those files? These are the very
concerns that the Privacy Act of 1974 was intended to address." Yet, as will
become clear in this Comment, there are significant problems with at least
one aspect of this Act, and thus problems with answering these questions, as
the Act is applied today.
The first section of this Comment will provide background about the
Act, the historical and social setting in which it was written, and the inten-
tions of the Congress that passed it. Background will also be provided on the
evolution of the problems with the system of records analysis. It will then go
on to provide the current state of the analysis and the precedent set by the
7. Today, with online ordering and delivery services available for everything from gro-
ceries to books and movies to gourmet dinners, a person could go months without even setting
foot inside a store. How inconceivable that would have been just fifty years ago, or even
twenty. Though local shops do still exist, the small towns where the owners knew everyone in
the neighborhood are few-and thus we are left with the ever-increasing computerization of
our lives and our life stories.
8. Consider how many government forms every citizen fills out: tax returns, vehicle reg-
istrations, voter registrations, census surveys; then add all of the specialized forms: patent ap-
plications, farm quota assessments, employment applications. The number of forms has gotten
so large that most government agencies have their forms identified by a serial number or form
code, printed on each form so that it can later be identified and matched with its intended pur-
pose. The next time you fill out a government form look in the corner for the official Gov-
ernment Printing Office (GPO) number.
9. OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT
OVERVIEW 779 (2002).
10. Just ten years ago, 40 gigabytes (GB) of data on a single personal computer's hard
drive was unthinkable. Six years ago, a two GB hard drive was considered perfectly reason-
able. Today, two GB can be filled by just the operating system and pre-installed software. Not
to mention the increases in processing speeds and the advent of Ethernet as a replacement for
modem speeds.
11. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
[Vol. 39
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D.C. Circuit Court in Henke v. United States Department of Commerce.12
The second section will introduce the conflict that has arisen between the
current interpretations of the Privacy Act and the advances in technology.
Part III will illustrate the sources of the problem with the system of records
analysis that developed as a result of the decision in Henke. The fourth sec-
tion of this Comment will analyze the problem and discuss two possible
avenues that can be taken in response to the conflict. It will consider the pos-
sible repercussions of either approach, for although the current Act may have
flaws, any solution may create other problems that far exceed those solved.
In conclusion, this Comment suggests that reforms must be undertaken.
While they should be done cautiously, they must be done without delay, for
to wait is to find ourselves falling further and further behind the onslaught of
technology.
I. BACKGROUND
The Privacy Act must be considered in light of its historical basis, just
as the problems it currently faces cannot be understood without an apprecia-
tion of the technological advances in recent years, and the interpretations of
the Privacy Act by courts. Specifically, interpretations of the term "system of
records," by which courts responded to those technological changes, are cen-
tral to understanding the different types of problems encountered between
the Privacy Act and advancing technology.
A. Brief History of the Privacy Act
The Privacy Act of 1974 was passed on December 31, 1974, and went
into effect on September 27, 1975."3 It serves the dual purpose of protecting
individuals' private information from disclosure by those government agen-
cies who have collected it, 4 and of enabling individuals to determine what
information has been collected and to verify its accuracy. 5 The Act also
provides a mechanism for individuals to challenge their records and request
corrections of the data stored by an agency, 6 and a remedy against those
who do not comply. 7 The Privacy Act specifically applies to government
agencies, such as the Executive branch, the military, and federal depart-
j12. Henke v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
13. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). Although this may seem like a
long delay since the original 1890 article, the primary focus of privacy law in early part of the
century related more to privacy torts between individuals. It was not until later, when the vol-
ume of information stored by the government increased, that privacy concerns of this kind
arose.
14. Id. § 552a(b).
15. Id. § 552a(d), (f).
16. Id. § 552a(d).
17. Id. § 552a(g), (i).
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ments.18 Similar statutes have been passed that cover other types of organiza-
tions, providing additional rights and remedies. 19
Because the Privacy Act was passed quickly, and at the end of the
ninety-third Congress, its legislative history has not always been helpful in
determining the original intent of the legislature or in interpreting the lan-
guage.2" The bills passed by the House and the Senate were not identical,
and no conference committee was convened, therefore there is no official
committee report and the early Congressional reports do not necessarily cor-
respond to the statute that was actually enacted.2' The Act has been amended
several times since its original enactment, but none of the amendments have
directly addressed the changes in technology that have occurred since
1974.22 The changes have been dramatic in the way information is now
stored and retrieved,23 which plays a significant role in the classification of
records under the Privacy Act.24 In a movement away from the paper or mi-
crofiche systems of the past, electronic storage of data has become the wide-
spread means of keeping records.2 5
A basic requirement to show that the Privacy Act applies is that the re-
cords are contained within a "system of records."2 6 Under the Act, an agency
will only grant an individual access to records which are stored in a "system
of records." 27 All government agencies are required to report the systems of
records that they maintain and to describe in detail the information collected,
the purpose for which it was collected, and the person or office to which re-
18. Id. § 552a(a)(1), (c), (f).
19. See, e.g., Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §
1232 (2000); Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Privacy Act of 1986), 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2521 (2000).
20. OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY
ACT OVERVIEW 777 (2002).
21. Id.
22. 5 U.S.C.S. § 552a (Bender 2002).
23. Printed or handwritten data that once filled volumes can now be stored on a micro-
chip. Entire encyclopedias are stored on just a few CD-ROMs. Computer search engines can
find a single use of a word within a file. All of these advancements make data storage easier,
smaller, and faster, but they also make the Privacy Act harder to use.
24. See Henke v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Baker v. Dep't of the Navy, 814 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1987).
25. OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY
ACT OVERVtEW 779 (Pamela Maida ed., 2002).
26. See 5 U.S.C. 552a(b), (d), (f); see also Office and Management and Budget's (OMB)
Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,741-43 (1975).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000). It is interesting to note that in contrast to the policies of
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the sister to the Privacy Act, here only the individu-
als about whom the records are kept may access those records. However, under FOIA, mem-
bers of the general public may request documents, but only limited information must be re-
leased and substantial sections may be redacted based on the privileges allowed. The Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). No such privileges exist under the Privacy Act,
thus when someone is entitled to access to his record, he would typically be allowed access to
the entire record, much to the dismay of many agencies.
[Vol. 39
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quests for records should be sent.28 Agencies are also required to go through
an approval process prior to establishing a new system of records. All of the
information about each system of records is then published by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) on paper in the Federal Register as well as
on the Federal Register website.2 ' Thus the process appears to be quite clear,
until you consider the problem of determining which groups of records in
which agencies qualify as "systems of records."
The term "system of records" is an artificial distinction, legislatively
created to identify those groups of records to which the Privacy Act applies,
and those to which it does not apply.3" According to the Privacy Act: "the
term 'system of records' means a group of any records under the control of
any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individ-
ual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular
assigned to the individual."31 The "system of records" analysis involves ex-
amining the actual retrieval methods used by an agency to determine if the
records fit into the definition, that is, if the records are retrieved by an indi-
vidual's name or identifying code (such as a Social Security number).32
However, with today's databases, this analysis is breaking down. Agencies
have the capability of searching based on virtually any word or number con-
tained in their systems.33 This capability leads to the question of how many
actual retrievals of information using someone's name are sufficient to cre-
ate a system of records.34 It ishere that the Privacy Act begins to show that it
has not kept up with technology and where it is most in need of clarification.
B. Current System of Records Analysis
1. Interpretation in Henke v. United States Department of Commerce
Henke v. United States Department of Commerce is the leading author-
ity on the system of records analysis,3 and has been widely accepted by
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2000).
29. Privacy Act Issuances, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/sudocs/aces/ PrivacyAct.shtml
(last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
30. The definition provided by the Privacy Act is not based on the ordinary, plain mean-
ing of the words "system of records," but is in fact a very specific type of system, with very
particular rules. This distinction likely arose out of the need to create some kind of distinction
between groups of records that should be accessible and those that should not.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (2000).
32. Henke, 83 F.3d at 1459-60.
33. All one has to do is press SinFr-F on most computers, regardless of the program, and
a dialog box for a word search will appear. Depending on the sophistication of the program,
different parameters can be set, but the basic search will simply look at each word in the
document, compare it to the one typed into the search field, and return the matches.
34. Cf Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461 (noting that when records are compiled for investigatory
purposes, even a few retrievals might be sufficient to create a system of records).
35. Id.
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courts." This case reinforced a distinction between the capability to retrieve
records by individuals' names and the practice of actual retrieval by names
that was set out in the OMB Guidelines. 37 The appellant, a scientist, presi-
dent, and co-owner of a company that develops earthquake technology,
claimed that the Privacy Act had been violated when she was denied access
to records from the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the National
Science Foundation (NSF).38 The records had been submitted by her com-
pany in an application to the DOC's Advanced Technology Program (ATP)
for a grant, which was denied.39 The appellant's name had been used as the
"contact name" for the company; however, the records were not indexed by
contact name, nor were they actually retrieved in practice by contact name,
despite the ATP's capability to do so.' The court held that mere capability
was not sufficient to create a system of records.41
The court considered three primary factors in its decision, which have
become the basis for the current system of records analysis. Initially, the
court looked at whether or not the agency had a practice of retrieving records
by the contact name.42 To meet the standard, an individual would have to
show that the agency not only had the capability of retrieving records by the
individual's name, but that they in practice used that capability.43 Here, al-
though the agency retrieved records using the appellant's name at her request
to prove that they had the capability, because they did not do so as a general
practice, the court held that this did not constitute the necessary type of re-
trievals.44
The court went on to consider the record-keeping agency's function and
why the information was gathered.45 The names were collected as points of
contact between the DOC and companies filing applications with it.46 The
court pointed out that collection of the names was not strictly necessary to
the function of the DOC, it was merely a convenience.47 A phone or fax
36. See e.g., Fisher v. Nat'l Inst. Health, 934 F. Supp. 464 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Alexander v.
FBI, 193 F.R.D. 1, 6-8 (D.D.C. 2000). But see Williams v. Virginia, 104 F.3d 670, 674-77 &
n.4 (4th Cir. 1997).
37. Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461 n.12.
38. Id. at 1455. The DOC and NSF were co-defendants in this suit, however, it was un-
clear the exact participation of the NSF in this litigation because the court specifically noted
that the NSF did have a system of records that they had properly identified with a systems no-
tice.
39. Id. at 1457. The ATP was a program within the DOC's National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology.
40. Id. at 1456.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1457-58.
43. Id. at 1460.
44. Id. at 1461-62.
45. Id. at 1461.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1462.
400 [Vol. 39
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number alone would have served its purposes.48 The court also indicated that
certain purposes, such as investigations, would allow a much more lenient
analysis and "even a few retrievals of information, keyed to individuals'
names" would suffice for a system of records to exist.49
The final point the court considered was whether the records were actu-
ally about the individuals named, regardless of the retrieval capability and
usage.5" If the records were not about the individuals named, then the Act
would not apply and the application would be invalid.5 For an individual to
retrieve records under the Privacy Act, the records have to actually be about
that individual-it is not enough that the individual is mentioned in the re-
cords.52 Here, the court determined that these records were not actually about
the appellant, thus she was not entitled to the records under the Privacy
Act.53
2. Comparison of Henke With Other Holdings
Fisher v. National Institutes of Health was decided the same year as
Henke and strictly applied the Henke holding to a claim where investigation
files were indexed by institution name, rather than by individual name.54 The
court determined that despite the investigatory purpose of the files, the fact
that the files were not retrieved by name barred the finding of a system of
records.5 This opinion also emphasized the concept that the system of re-
cords had to be in existence at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.56 The
court did not find it persuasive that the agency later created a system of re-
cords, published a systems notice, and used names of individuals to locate
files.57
In Baker v. Department of the Navy, the court held that even when the
records were collected specifically for investigation of the individual seeking
the records, if there is no retrieval capability or use under her name, then the
request may be denied.58 In Baker, the requestor was the subject of an inves-
tigation, but the records were filed under the name of the individual who in-
stigated the investigation and no cross-referencing occurred, thus there was
no Privacy Act claim.59 The court notes that the system of records analysis is
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1461.
50. Id. at 1462.
51. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000).
52. OMB's Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,957 (1975).
53. Henke, 83 F.3d at 1462.
54. Fisher v. Nat'l Inst. of Health, 934 F. Supp. 464, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
55. Id. at 473.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Baker v. Dep't of the Navy, 814 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1987).
59. Id. at 1382.
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the one aspect of the Privacy Act where a record is judged not on its content,
but on its method of retrieval. Interestingly, Baker was actually decided
years before Henke or Fisher.61 It does not appear to be in conflict with ei-
ther of those decisions, but its position seems to make it harder to establish a
system of records. However, when Henke says that "even a few retrievals,
keyed to individuals' names" would suffice for a system of records to exist,
that indicates that investigatory purposes is not enough alone either. 61
3. Summary of Overall Scheme
Generally, there must be retrievals of some kind, in some number, for
there to be a system of records.62 If there are many such retrievals, then a
system of records is established and the analysis ends.63 If there are rela-
tively few retrievals, then the other factors, such as purpose of collection,
must be considered.6' However, this leaves substantial gaps in the analysis
due to the changing way data is stored.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONTROVERSY
If retrievability is the key issue here, then the manner of retrieval should
give great insight into the problem. However, it is not as clear as it used to
be. In the past, paper or microfiche files were the standard and they were ac-
companied by an index of some form so that one could locate the particular
files one needed. By examining the index and comparing it to the order in
which the files were stored, it was fairly easy to determine whether a group
of records was indexed according to name, Social Security number, or some
other identifier, and thus fell under the Privacy Act.
Today, however, this is not how data storage works. Groups of records
that are stored in computer databases do not require a separate index, which
makes it more difficult to determine how the data is indexed or catalogued.
Those groups of records that are still maintained on paper or microfiche, but
which now have a computerized index, also no longer fit the original analy-
sis. The computerized "index" is not an index in the ordinary sense of the
word. It does not require that one have the same type of information that a
paper indexing system would require to find the needed record. Instead, any
information about the record at all will usually be sufficient.65 Thus, the en-
60. Baker was decided in 1987, nine years before either Henke or Fisher in 1996 and
thirteen years after the original version of the Privacy Act was passed.
61. Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461, see supra note 49.
62. Supra Part I.B.1.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Granted, some types of information may be more effective or more efficient than
others at narrowing down the possible files to find the one you want, but the record will still
be retrieved.
[Vol. 39
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tire analysis has broken down. One can no longer look at a group of records
and determine whether the Privacy Act applies, one must go through the
analysis of how the system is used and how retrievals are done, as laid out in
Henke. Yet even Henke does not provide an answer for the most modem
groups of records, as discussed in the following section.
III. CREATION OF THE PROBLEM
A. Computer Databases
Computer databases are used to store millions of records throughout the
government for virtually every agency at federal, state, and local levels.
66
From property taxes to employment data to Medicare claims, everything is
stored in some type of database.67 Because of these databases, actual re-
trieval is no longer an indication that the records were filed or indexed ac-
cording to the individuals' names. Retrieval is easily done without that kind
of filing system or index.68 Files are accessible by name or any other piece of
data within a record; a computer database does not need to be indexed by a
particular field in order for it to find a record containing that data. Although
it may be easier to retrieve records when indexed this way (easier for the
user, not necessarily the computer), it really does not matter. A computer can
simply do a textual search of all of its records and whenever the searched-for
word appears, it will flag the record, regardless of whether the word is in the
expected field.69
Modem database software such as Microsoft® Access and Lotus
NotesTM are the real source of this problem.7" As agencies converted their
old mainframe databases to these newer, more user-friendly versions, they
changed the way users are able to interact with the stored data. Where the
66. See OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE &
PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 777 (2002).
67. See e.g., John Eckhouse, Why Nothing's Secret Anymore, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.,
Mar. 15, 1993 at El (discussing the variety and accessibility of information stored in com-
puter databases). The number of files and records has become so large that for federal agen-
cies as well as state and local ones, it would be impracticable to try to maintain non-
computerized files. See supra notes 8 and 23.
68. See supra note 33.
69. Following a text search of this kind, any records containing the searched word will be
flagged (usually by listing in the dialog box), and can be accessed without any reference to or
knowledge of the record number or other identifying information (i.e. the information by
which the records was actually indexed). Note, however, that one can achieve the effect of a
paper index with a more advanced search (typical that it takes more technology to simulate
the old-fashioned searches), by limiting the search to only a specific field in the records. Thus,
when you go to the library and look up "Shakespeare" as "Author", it will not return the many
books written by others about Shakespeare, where his name is in the title or keywords, it will
only return those books where he is listed as author.
70. No, this is not another harangue against Bill Gates, just an observation about how
this all got started.
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older mainframe databases only allowed searches on particular fields, and
had to be specifically programmed to do those searches, the new software
allows a straight text search on every bit of information entered into a data-
base, regardless of where it is located within a given record. The difference
in search capabilities between the old and new databases is why, despite the
fact that records have been stored on computers for decades, the problem
with accessibility of records has just emerged.
Consider a hypothetical system of records indexed by the names of in-
vestigating officers. One officer's name is Michael Jones. There is a record
listed under another officer's name containing an investigation on Sally
Michaels. If one wanted to know what Michael Jones was working on and so
searched the database for 'Michael', not only would all of Michael Jones'
cases show up, but so would Sally Michaels' investigation.7' If Sally then
came looking for a copy of her records, how would this be treated under the
current system? This was an actual retrieval, but the records were not in-
dexed according to subjects' names. Further, the search retrieved her file, but
the searcher was not trying to do that; he was looking for an entirely differ-
ent set of files. This situation presents the problem of finding a system of re-
cords in existence when analyzing it using one name and finding that it does
not exist when using a different name. Thus, the system of records analysis
appears variable. While the above situation would be considered a system of
records with respect to the investigator, it is not considered a system of re-
cords as applied to the subject of an investigation, simply because her name
was not used to file the records. How can a group of records be a system of
records in one case but not in another?
Not only does this present a logical paradox, it also creates a legal one.
Agencies are required to identify and disclose their systems of records to the
public through the OMB. If a particular group of records can be seen as ei-
ther a system of records or not, how is the agency to determine if it needs to
disclose those records? Are agencies expected to disclose all records that
have even the potential to be a system of records? Somehow that seems a
waste of time, money, and resources without substantial benefit to the pub-
lic.
B. Computer Stored Records in Comparison with Computer Indexed Records
There is another area of uncertainty within the system of records analy-
sis in the cases where an organization still maintains paper files, filed by
case number, but maintains a searchable computer database that indexes the
71. Most searches will find all instances of the particular combination of letters, thus a
search for "Michael" would also return "Michaels," "Michaelson," and so on. Here is a
frightening test: run a search for the word "the" on a document. What you will find is that
large numbers of results are returned for even a short document because "the," "them,"
"then," "their," "theater," etc. are all returned.
[Vol. 39
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paper files.7 2 In these situations, a great deal depends on how much and what
type of information is put into the index. If it is in a modem database system
and set up with certain key fields,73 but also provides a space for a descrip-
•tion of the file, to help identify the particular case from other similar ones,
then any word in that textual description could be found in a search, even
though it was not being used as a key field for the index.
How does this type of record storage fit into the analysis? A significant
issue, of course, is whether or not the organization actually searches its data-
base using individuals' names. If it does not, then Henke applies, the analy-
sis ends, and there is no system of records.74 If the organization does search
by name, it is not actually retrieving the individuals' records by its search, it
is just obtaining the case numbers and file location or whatever other identi-
fying information was input into the system. Perhaps a court would consider
the database a system of records separate from the paper records themselves,
but more likely the entire system, computer index and paper files, comprise a
system of records. Unfortunately, until a case presents this issue, the analysis
changes, or it is decided in some other way, neither the public, nor govern-
ment agencies can be sure.
C. Evolution into a System of Records
As described above, the Privacy Act and the OMB require that all gov-
ernmental agencies get approval for and publish a systems notice when they
are creating a new system of records." The Guidelines provide instructions
for setting up these new systems, but do not explain what must be done to
convert an existing filing system into a system of records when the system
simply changed over the years, rather than changing as a result of a specific
new policy or procedure.76 There are filing systems that have been in exis-
tence for many years, and in some cases the systems have been modified
such that they should be listed as systems of records. For these systems, ad-
vancements in technology transformed the systems over time and it is diffi-
cult to pinpoint the date when the filing system became a system of records.
72. This is likely the case when an agency is maintaining handwritten field reports and
other non-typewritten records, such as photographs, chemical or other laboratory test results,
or even physical evidence itself. In the case of photographs or non-physical evidence, though
technology makes it possible to store all of this on computer, every agency may not have that
ability or may not have implemented those activities. Thus, some agencies have adopted these
combination systems, so that they can still find information quickly, but the computer only
provides the location, not the actual data.
73. Key fields for this type of index might include the case or identifying number, the
name of the case, if any, and any other specific information regarding the location of the
physical file (such as a room number, or storage cabinet number, etc.).
74. Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2000); OMB's Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948,
28,962-63 (1975).
76. OMB's Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,963 (1975).
11
Sullivan: Will the Privacy Act of 1974 Still Hold Up in 2004? How Advancing
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Agencies do not have guidance for many of the issues surrounding conver-
sion of older groups of records into systems of iecords.
Consider the following questions that would arise if an agency decides
to publish a systems notice for an existing system. Does publishing a notice
mean that all records filed in the system would be available under the Pri-
vacy Act, even those that were collected well before the records evolved into
a system of records? What about records that were collected after the system
of records evolved, but before it was officially recognized, i.e. before the
systems notice was published? Generally ex post facto regulations or statutes
are disfavored; is that not what creating such a rule would be? Why should
agencies be required to hand over records that were collected prior to the
time when the systems notice goes into effect?
IV. ANALYSIS
The new reality of how agencies store and retrieve their records presents
two possible futures for the Privacy Act. If the Privacy Act remains un-
changed, then we must accept that the current application of the Henke
analysis has broadened the accessibility of records to the public beyond the
original scope of the Act. Alternatively, if the Privacy Act is amended to
overrule Henke and change or clarify the system of records analysis, the ma-
jority of the original limitations could remain intact.77
A. Accepting the Broadened Access
The combination of the Henke analysis with extensive computerization
of records has resulted in a widening of the range of records accessible under
the Privacy Act. When an agency upgrades its databases to be fully comput-
erized, the new systems provide search functions that do not rely upon the
method of indexing. 8 Thus, when looking for a particular record, it is often
easiest to search on a particular word or name within that record, even if the
record is not otherwise about the search term, rather than searching for the
case number or the report title or other official identifier.79 As a result, the
77. See OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT -GUIDE &
PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 795-97 (2002).
78. Meaning the use of newer database software, such as Microsoft® Access or Lotus
NotesTM, that allows for full text searches.
79. This is particularly true when the indexing method or the case name, etc. has many
duplications. For instance, consider a Fisher-type situation, where the NIH indexes according
to the name of the institution or organization, except in this case the files are completely com-
puterized and the staff makes use of the search functions. If one were to do a search for Ab-
bott Laboratories (a large biotech company), there would likely be thousands or records re-
sulting. However, if one recalled that someone named Alice Smith gave a statement regarding
the particular case, it would be far easier to search using her name, because it would likely
show up in far fewer records and it would be easy to determine which were the needed re-
cords.
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agency has performed actual retrievals using individuals' names and there-
fore the major factor in the Henke analysis is met. The added retrievability
has broadened the extent of the records considered to be in a system of re-
cords, and along the way, the public's access to those records.
An argument in response to this apparent broadening of accessibility is
that requests under the Privacy Act where searches are done as described
above would not be granted. They would legitimately be denied because the
records would not be about the requestor and thus the Privacy Act would not
apply. However, this is not necessarily the case. There may be agencies
where records are maintained that are arguably "about" a particular re-
questor, yet but for the computerized searching those records would not be
accessible because they were not indexed by a personal identifier.8"
In those instances, it may seem that allowing access would be preferable
because access would conform to the spirit of the law: giving an individual
access to files stored by the government that are about that individual. How-
ever, there may be legitimate and important reasons for maintaining the files
in such a way as to avoid granting access, such as national security. In
Fisher, the court did not require such critical reasons or interests of the
agency at all.8 The fact that the NIH had always maintained their files in
that way was sufficient for the court to hold that there should be no access,
even without a showing of particular reasons why it was necessary for the
NIH to use that filing method. 82
There is also the possibility that a different interpretation of Henke
might evolve in the courts, upon presentation of a different set of facts. Al-
though it may not be clear at the present time what facts a court might find
sufficiently distinct from Henke and Fisher to produce a different result,
there is certainly room for courts to limit the Henke holding. Not only would
judicial constriction of the Henke holding likely provide a more palatable re-
sult than simply accepting the situation as it is, it would also be an easier
process than amendment of the Act.
Does all of this really mean that allowing the scope of the Privacy Act
to broaden is a bad decision? After all, was the Act not written to protect the
public from use and misuse of records by the government? Although it does
seem to be a logical conclusion that allowing a broader application of the
Privacy Act would further its original purpose, the carefully struck balance
between private concerns and government interests might ultimately be de-
stroyed.
80. Consider Fisher v. NIH, the case where an investigation record was denied to a re-
questor because the records were indexed based on the individual initiating the investigation
and the institution at which the person worked, rather than the subject of the investigation,
and likely, the record.
81. Id. at 473.
82. Id.
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B. Amending to Retain the Intended Access
An amendment to the Privacy Act could both clarify the system of re-
cords analysis and help to maintain and re-establish the original intent and
limitations of the Act. Any amendment passed to the Privacy Act would
have to reconcile the differences between the holding of Henke and the cur-
rent computerized methods of data storage and the purpose of the Act itself.
Here we must look to the specific wording of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, as well as the reality of the computerized world. Right now, advances
in technology appear to have shifted somewhat, with the focus on making
storage bigger and speeds faster, not on altering the basic concept and struc-
ture underlying the machines. Thus, it is probably an ideal time to consider
such an amendment. Now that so many government agencies' records are
stored in today's databases, when future advances arrive, agencies will
probably switch over slowly, and only after the new technology has been
well proven in the private sector.83
It could be argued that changing the Privacy Act by amendment may
create more problems than it solves. 84 Or it could create an entirely new set
of unforeseen effects with their own problems. It may be that leaving the Act
alone will result in the least conflict; there is no way to know in advance ei-
ther way. Other than just leaving the Privacy Act as it currently stands, the
Act could be repealed entirely and new legislation put into place. This, how-
ever, seems too draconian a solution for a problem that exists only in one
section of the Act. Although other sections of the Act may also benefit from
updating, eliminating them entirely is not likely to help solve any problems.
Unfortunately, if left without any changes, the Privacy Act may become so
outdated in the future that eliminating it and starting over may be the only
solution. Thus, an amendment now, though complicated, may save even
more work later.
An amendment would need to address three specific areas of the Privacy
Act to be fully effective. First, it would need to establish exactly what a sys-
tem of records is and how one is created, i.e. what combination of organiza-
tion and retrievals is necessary to qualify. Importantly, the retrieval factor
should not be keyed to a particular number of retrievals, since this would
vary from agency to agency, and what might be a full year's worth of re-
trievals for one agency, might be only a week's to another. Perhaps a solu-
tion would be to consider the percentage of the total retrievals that are done
by individuals' names as a minimum standard. Although many legal solu-
tions involve applying a standard of reasonableness, that is essentially what
83. Karen Kaplan, Bringing the IRS into the 21st Century, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1999, at
Cl (describing the long-awaited upgrade of the IRS computer system into a comprehensive,
modem database system).
84. For example, requiring excessive court involvement or supervision or creating high
costs of system renovation and maintenance for the OMB might be problems created by an
amendment.
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was established by Henke, where the court said that a reasonable number of
retrievals for the circumstances would suffice to show that a system of re-
cords existed.85 This is the very standard that has not worked so far, thus a
more specific measure should be implemented here.
Second, the amendment would, need to address the procedures for sys-
tems that have evolved into systems of records, including a timeline of
which records are accessible under the Privacy Act. If the amendment allows
information collected before the system of records developed to remain in-
accessible, agencies will need to know how to publish their systems notices
to identify information collected as part of a system of records, while ex-
empting information that does not qualify. Also important would be an ex-
planation of this change in policy for the public. The easiest means of
achieving this would be to have the OMB provide an explanation of accessi-
bility, and the way agencies determine accessibility, along with its published
systems notices. Because individuals generally go through the OMB to find
information about systems of records, they would find out about the new
policies at the same time.86
Finally, the amendment should make allowances for future changes in
technology, to the best that today's predictions can establish. This last area
would likely be the most difficult to do successfully; however, it could be
done by simply including a statement that future disagreements are to be re-
solved to conform with the original intent of the Act. The amendment could
also recommend or require that the technology situation be reevaluated at
regular intervals, in order to keep the processes current and to avoid a sig-
nificant overhaul of the data and procedures in the future.
Alternatively, instead of providing substantive changes to the analysis,
the amendment could simply restate the original intent of the Privacy Act or
some narrowed intent. Then the amendment could direct that all future con-
struction of the Act merely conform with that explained intent. This restated
intent should take into account concerns of national security or whatever
other interests Congress deems relevant in today's world. If Congress takes
this approach and decides to avoid making specific substantive changes, then
the interpretation of the Privacy Act will ultimately end up in the courts
again. In that case, the courts will have a lot of leeway in deciding how best
to interpret the new language, but at least they would be bound to the express
intent of Congress. This may not be the ideal solution, but it would be an
improvement over the current situation.
85. Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461.
86. Sometimes individuals are sent privacy notices by agencies maintaining records on
them and use those notices as their sole source of information. However, when notices are not
sent directly or when an individual wants to access all systems notices, that individual would
have to go through the OMB, because to access the notices through the agencies themselves
(more accurately, through their websites) would usually require an internal computer logon
and password. Even those agencies with public websites (ones that do not require passwords)
that make their systems notices available online merely do so by providing links that point to
the notices as published on the Federal Register's website. See supra Part I.A and note 29.
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The critical focus of an amendment should be upon the Privacy Act's
definition of "system of records" itself.87 It is in this definition that the most
effective change could be made, because all of the other provisions of the
Act depend upon the current definition.88 In each case, by updating the defi-
nition, the individual sections would be correspondingly revised. Although
an exceptionally long and detailed definition would probably only create
greater opportunities for disagreements and court interpretations, a definition
that recognizes the indexing method and computer database form, supported
by a clear Congressional record, would provide the necessary changes.
Likely a change to this section would necessitate changes at the level of the
OMB Guidelines as well, which would provide an additional opportunity for
clarification and detail.
The other section that would benefit from revision is the "agency re-
quirement" section, which provides the steps an agency must take to set up a
new system of records, properly identify it, and publish the systems notice.89
Depending on the approach taken in the amendment with regard to paper
files with computerized indices and to records that have evolved into sys-
tems of records, it may be necessary for the new systems notices to include
information such as applicable dates or categories of individuals who may
obtain the records.9" A danger in these situations is that by identifying re-
cords that the Privacy Act does not cover, an agency practically invites dis-
putes. However, if the amendment is sufficiently clear and the agency fol-
lows the statute, then the problems should be minimized.
The Privacy Act is ultimately a balancing of interests between the gov-
ernment agencies storing the records and the individuals about whom the re-
cords are kept. Currently the balance is wavering, and depending on the next
steps taken, it may shift so that the government agencies' interests have vir-
tually no protections under the Act. While the notion of the government
keeping secrets from the citizens of the United States does not sit well with
anyone, there can be legitimate reasons why an individual should not have
access to a particular record. Do we really want to eliminate all of the protec-
tions agencies have? Remember that the Privacy Act does not allow for ex-
ceptions or redactions of the record in most cases, thus agencies are required
to turn over entire records, including material generally protected from dis-
closure requirements.9 Do we really trust them so little and believe that their
decisions regarding access to records are unjustified? An amendment is nec-
87. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (2000); see supra Part L.A for current full definition.
88. See supra Part L.A and note 23.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2000).
90. With regard to the categories of people who may access the records, an example us-
ing the Henke case: if the appellant had applied for the grant personally, rather than as a com-
pany with her name listed as a contact, then she might have had success under this approach.
91. For example, there is no general exception for attorney work product or for privi-
leged attorney-client communications. While these privileges may apply in other situations,
they are not recognized under the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (2000).
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essary to rebalance this process. Consider also those agencies that think they
may have records that have evolved into systems of records, but are unsure
what to do about it. In those cases, an amendment clarifying these proce-
dures would actually increase the access of the public. Overall, an amend-
ment will serve both the government agencies and the public, and will save
the Privacy Act from falling further and further behind technology.
CONCLUSION
One theory in life is that if something is not broken, we should not try to
fix it. Although that may be true of toaster ovens and VCRs, it does not ap-
ply here. The Privacy Act is mostly working; it is not shooting off sparks and
threatening to burn down anyone's kitchen. For the most part, agencies pub-
lish their systems notices and individuals request and receive the information
they need. However, the Act is also creating a great deal of confusion for
both members of the public seeking access to their records, and for the agen-
cies who are maintaining those records. Perhaps this is the equivalent of
burned toast; not a fire hazard, but not exactly good either. Therefore, some-
thing needs to be done to clarify the situation. A decision needs to be made.
On the one hand, the OMB could simply issue a policy instructing agencies
to comply with the Henke holding and leave it at that. At the very least, that
would eliminate some of the confusion with regard to the duties that agen-
cies owe to the public. However, it would still leave substantial questions
unanswered, such as what to do with those existing systems that have
evolved into systems of records, and what about systems where only the in-
dex is computerized and searchable. On the other hand, the OMB could take
a more proactive approach and redefine the system of records analysis within
its own published Guidelines. These Guidelines do not have the weight of a
statutory amendment, but as the official policies of the federal department
that oversees the Privacy Act, they would likely gain the compliance of other
governmental agencies.
Another problem with leaving the Act as it stands now is that technol-
ogy is not likely to stand still. Huge advances in technology created this is-
sue in the first place. Though most people cannot predict what is ahead, it is
that very unpredictability that suggests changes need to be made now. If
nothing is done now, how much worse will the situation be in ten, twenty, or
thirty years? How much farther from the original intent of the Privacy Act
will technology have led us? In the past, most of the files collected, main-
tained, and requested were written or printed documents. Video and audio
cassettes simply took up too much space to store them on a regular basis, in
the ordinary course of business. Each cassette could only hold a certain
amount of data, and finding any particular information required listening to
or viewing the entire tape. Today, video and audio files are digitized and
now they can be stored as easily as any text file. A CD-ROM can be used to
store digital files that would replace volumes of printed material or audio
17
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and video data that would have taken up many cassettes. 92 With the advances
in voice recognition, the computer does the searching for information within
files. In these days of heightened national security and increasing surveil-
lance technology capabilities, audio and video files may become more com-
mon in the government's files. How is the Privacy Act going to be applied?
How are the public's concerns over this kind of intrusion going to be ad-
dressed?
We need an amendment to bring the Privacy Act up to date. We cannot
expect a convenient case will present itself to the courts in a timely fashion
to resolve this problem, and the problem will only grow with time. Although
this may not seem to be a priority in the public's mind, it is in everyone's
best interest that an amendment be passed. By the time most people become
truly interested in the workings of the Privacy Act, it is usually too late. At
that point, they are probably attempting to retrieve records from agencies
that have complied with the technical rules of the Privacy Act and the OMB
Guidelines, but have missed the intent of the Act. Or, they are dealing with
agencies that do not have the answers to the questions discussed here, have
not determined what they need to do, and thus cannot give access to their re-
cords. By the time people have gotten to this stage, it is too late to amend the
Privacy Act to give agencies more guidance and clearer rules. They will
have discovered that the Privacy Act is not really working, and does need to
be fixed. Thus, a timely amendment is in everyone's interest.
Julianne M. Sullivan*
92. Even the military has made this switch: their Official Military Personnel Files
(OMPF) are now stored on CD-ROM. The switch was made from the past microfiche system
because of the impracticality of microfiche and difficulty in ensuring a microfiche reader
would be available where needed, coupled with the ease of use of the CD-ROMs and the fact
that CD-ROM drives are found in virtually every computer made today.
* California Western School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2004; Northwestern University, B.S.
Biomedical Engineering, 2000; Thank you to my mother, Cathy, for all of her help and sup-
port.
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